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AMERICAN INDIAN INTERES TS
AND SUPREME COURT AGENDA SET TING
1969-1992 October Terms

JOHN R. HERMANN
Trinity University

A recent development in the judicial behavior literature on Supreme Court agenda setting is the
examination of case selection within particular areas of the law. To that end, this study examines
the Supreme Court's agenda-building process regarding American Indian Interests as a petition
ing litigant during the 1969-1992 October terms. Using a multivariate logistic regression model,
the findings indicate that judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model, the direct and
third party briefs filed by the Solicitor General's office for and against American Indian interests,
and the presence of a sovereignty issue were influential explanatory variables in the Supreme
Court's case selection process. Contrary to the expectations of this study, however, the petitioning
party alleging lower court conflict, dissension, and the number of amici curiae briefs filed in
support of, and in opposition to, American Indian interests were not important predictors.

One of the growing developments in the literature on agenda setting
in the Supreme Court of the United States is the analysis of case selection
within specific areas of the law. As McGuire and Caldeira (1993, 717)
point out, "A great deal is known about how the Court, in general,
selects cases .. . but next to nothing about how this winnowing takes
place in particular areas of law." In this study, I seek to make a contri
bution to that end by examining how the Supreme Court has chosen
cases for its plenary agenda within the field of federal Indian law.
More precisely, this study asks the question: How did American
Indian interests fare before the U.S. Supreme Court as a petitioning
litigant during the Burger and Rehnquist years (i.e., during the 19691992 October terms)? I also attempt to discern those factors that
Authors Note: This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the 1995
Southwest Political Science Association. I would like to thank Karen O'Connor and Thomas G.
Walker for their valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this article. I would also like to
express my gratitude to James C. Garand and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
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contributed to the success of American Indian interests before the
Court as a petitioning litigant.To explain their success, the effects of
seven explanatory variables are estimated: (a) the presence of the
Solicitor General's office as a party for and against American Indian
interests; (b) the presence of the Solicitor General's office as an amicus
curiae on behalf of, and in opposition to, American Indian interests;
(c) the presence of lower court dissension; (d) the presence of the
petitioning party alleging intercircuit court conflict; (e) the presence
of a sovereignty issue; (f) the number of amici curiae briefs filed by
organized interests for and against American Indian interests; and
(g) judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model.
There are several reasons that American Indian interests' treatment
by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts merits attention at the agenda
setting stage. First, at least two justices from the Burger Court have
placed great importance on cases involving American Indian interests.
As one justice stated, "We now have three westerners on the Court and
we are very concerned about ...Indian cases.And you can tell by our
votes for cert.that we are interested in them" (Perry 1991, 261).Another
justice stated, "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of fascinat
ing.It goes into history and you learn about it, and the way we abused
some of the Indians, we that is the U.S.government" (Perry 1991, 262).
Second, cases involving American Indian interests are receiving
more attention by the Court than ever before. The Supreme Court
decided more cases involving American Indian interests-35-in the
1970s than in any other previous decade in the Court's history (Wilkin
son 1987, 2). In the 1980s, the Supreme Court decided more than 40
cases involving issues critical to the interests of American Indians
(Hermann 1994, 2).Indeed, the Court is more interested in cases in
volving American Indian interests than many other types of cases.
Although less than 5% of all petitions for certiorari win review, over
20% of the 545 cases involving American Indian interests were granted
plenary review by the Court during the 1969-1992 October terms.1
Third, given that American Indian activities are regulated primarily
by the federal government (and not the states), the U.S. Supreme Court
plays a particularly important role in the policy formation of Indian
rights. Since the Marshal Court's decision in 1832, in Worcester v.
Georgia (31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515), the Court has usually held that "matters
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affecting Indians in Indian country are thus as a general rule excepted
from the usual application of state law" (Cohen 1982, 260).
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the concept of Supreme Court
agenda setting has special significance for politically disadvantaged
groups, including American Indian interests.2 If politically disadvan
taged groups have little clout in majoritarian institutions, the courts in
general, and the Supreme Court in particular, may be the last avenue
for these groups to redress their grievances.

EXPLAINING SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING

Given that the Court does not offer any hard and fast guidelines for
selecting cases for its plenary agenda,3 judicial scholars have at
tempted to explain the Court's case selection process systematically.
T he literature on Supreme Court agenda setting can be classified under
two broad categories: cue theory and judicial attitudes as manifested
by the attitudinal model (but, see Perry 1991; Provine 1980).

CUE THEORY

Cue theorists posit that the justices of the Supreme Court use cues
as a means "for separating those petitions worthy of scrutiny from
those that may be discarded without further study" (Tanenhaus et al.
1963, 158). T he general idea behind cue theory is that the justices need
a "quick and dirty way" of determining the certiorari-worthy cases.
One of the most important cues in explaining the Court's decision
to grant petitions for certiorari has been the presence of the Solicitor
General's office as a petitioning litigant (Armstrong and Johnson
1982; Salokar 1992; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirk
losky 1972). During the 1959-1989 October terms, for example, the
Solicitor General's office was successful in seeking certiorari in
approximately 70% of the 1,294 cases where it was a petitioning
litigant (Salokar 1992, 25). As Tanenhaus et al. (1963, 160) point out,
the attorneys in the Solicitor General's office "have the talent, the
resources, and the experience to fully exploit the strong aspects of their
cases, and in reply briefs to expose the most glaring weaknesses of
their opponents."
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In cases involving American Indian interests, the Solicitor Gen
eral's petitioning briefs should play an especially important role in the
decision-making calculus of the Court at the agenda-setting stage. The
United States and American Indians have what is commonly called a
fiduciary relationship, which "arises out of the constitutional plan to
delegate plenary authority over American Indian affairs to the federal
government and the duties undertaken by treaty and federal statute"
(Cohen 1982, 651). Thus, in many cases involving American Indian
interests, the Solicitor General's office acts as a trustee, as a direct and
third party to protect American Indian rights. Given the special trust
relationship between American Indians and the federal government,
coupled with the fact that the Solicitor General's office as a petitioning
party has been an important cue for the Court in determining its
certiorari-worthy cases, one might anticipate that the Solicitor Gen
eral's direct party briefs will significantly increase the chances that the
Court will grant a case involving American Indian interests certiorari.
In stark contrast, one might anticipate that the Court would be less
inclined to grant the petition for certiorari in cases where the Solicitor
General's office was a party in opposition to American Indian interests.
The Solicitor General's office as petitioning third party is also
examined in this study. Salokar (1992, 27), for example, found that
the Court granted review in 88% of the cases where the Solicitor
General's office filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the petition
ing litigant. (In addition, see Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Caldeira and
Wright 1990b; McGuire and Caldeira 1993.) On the basis of the salient
role of the Solicitor General's office at the agenda-setting stage and
the most impressive success rates of the office as an amicus curiae at the
decision on the merits stage (i.e., Scigliano 1971; Salokar 1992), a
reasonable expectation is that the Court will be more inclined to grant
certiorari in cases involving American Indian interests where the
Solicitor General's office filed an amicus curiae brief in comparison
to when no such cue is present. Conversely, one might expect that the
Court would be less likely to grant certiorari in cases where the
Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in opposition to granting
certiorari.
The presence of dissension and alleged intercircuit court conflict in
the lower courts also have shown to increase the chances that the Court
will accept a case for full review (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984).4
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Chief Justice Fred Vinson, for example, considered dissension and
conflict important criteria in determining the Court's decision to grant
certiorari: "Our discretionary jurisdiction encompasses, for the most
part, only the borderline cases-those in which there is a conflict
among the lower courts or widespread uncertainty regarding problems.
of national importance" (Tanenhaus et al. 1963, 161). Tanenhaus et al.
(1963, 161) found that the Court granted approximately 13% of the
petitions for certiorari in cases where a dissension cue was present
during the 1947-1958 October terms; in comparison, the Court granted
certiorari in only 6% of the cases where no cue was present. The
literature strongly suggests that the presence of dissension in the lower
courts would increase the likelihood that the Court would grant
certiorari in cases involving American Indian interests. In this study,
dissension is defined in the tradition of the original cue theorists,
Tanenhaus et al. (1963); that is, a petition where there is a disagree
ment by the judges in the court directly below or where there is
disagreement between two lower courts in the same case. In the former
type of dissension, at least onejudge on the court below had to dissent
or concur. In the latter type, the court of appeals had to reverse the
lower court decision.
One might also reasonably anticipate that the alleged intercircuit
court conflict cue might apply to cases involving American Indian
interests. Petitioning attorneys perceive that discussing intercircuit
court conflict in their briefs increases the chances that their petitions
will be given plenary review by the Court (Ulmer 1984). This obser
vation is also supported by comments from several staff attorneys at
the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). When asked what ele
ments make up a particularly good certiorari petition, one staff attor
ney replied, "I get the Supreme Court rules out and the Supreme Court
litigation book, Stern and Gressman . . . I look for the usual things,
conflicts in the circuits" (Author interview; May 20, 1994). A former
staff attorney at NARF remarked, "If there is conflict on an issue
between the circuits, then I play that up as much as possible. Similarly,
if the lower court is out of line with existing Supreme Court principles
of law, I stress that fact" (Author interview; May 19, 1994). Caldeira
and Wright (1988, 1120) confirm these attorneys' observations with
quantitative data, concluding that "[E]vidently, the best advice for
petitioning attorneys is to allege as many conflicts as possible." For
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purposes here, alleged intercircuit court conflict is defined as any case
where the petitioning party claims that there is conflict among or
between the state supreme, federal circuit, or U.S. Supreme courts.
The presence of certain issues, moreover, appears to increase the
probability that the Court will give favorable treatment to a petition
for certiorari. In particular, the presence of a civil liberties issue has
been an important cue for the Court in determining its plenary agenda
(i.e., Tanenhaus et al. 1963). Although civil liberties issues are ger
mane to American Indian interests, they are not as critical as other
issues. One basic and important issue confronting American Indian
interests is sovereignty, the power oflndian tribes to regulate their own
affairs without state and federal governmental interference (Cohen
1982; Swagerty 1979; Wilkinson 1987).
For purposes of this study, I expect that in cases where there is a
sovereignty issue present, the Court is more inclined to grant petitions
for certiorari in relation to when no such cue is present. Given that
sovereignty issues define the role of American Indians and tribes in
the American political universe, the Court might give these issues
greater attention than many other ones.For greater conceptual speci
ficity, sovereignty is defined here as an issue raised in a case involving
governmental regulation of tribal affairs.This definition possesses two
crucial characteristics.First, sovereignty issues only involve disputes
in Indian country, not actions involving American Indians outside of
Indian country. Second, the states or federal government would have
to attempt to infringe on the rights of a citizen of a tribe or attempt to
limit tribal autonomy; or, the tribal governments may try to extend
their own jurisdiction over Indians or non-Indians in Indian country.
Curiously, until recently the role of organized interests before the
Court has been examined only at the decision-on-the-merits stage.
Realizing the apparent void in the literature, judicial scholars have
begun to examine the litigation activities of organized interests before
the Court at the agenda-setting stage (Caldeira and Wright 1988,
1990a, 1990b; McGuire and Caldeira 1993). In one study, Caldeira
and Wright (1988, 1119) conclude that for the 1982 term the "more
briefs filed [by organized interests ] in favor of certiorari in any given
case, the better chances for plenary review." In addition, McGuire and
Caldeira (1993) find that the number of amici curiae briefs filed by
organized interests in support of a libertarian petition increased the
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likelihood of the Court granting the case plenary review during the

1957-1987 October terms. On the basis of these recent findings, one
would expect that the more briefs filed by organized interests in favor
of an American Indian petition, the more inclined the Court is to give
the case its full attention. In this study, one might also anticipate that
the more briefs filed against American Indian interests, the more
inclined the Court is to deny the petition for certiorari.

JUDICIALATIITUDES

One of the unsettled controversies in the literature on Supreme
Court agenda setting is whether judicial attitudes (as manifested by
the attitudinal model) play an important role in Court decision making.
Many political scientists (i.e., Palmer 1982; Schubert 1964; Ulmer

1978) argue that the Court uses what judicial scholars commonly call
the "error correcting" strategy.5 More precisely, the Court takes cases
when it seeks "to 'correct errors' in the lower courts by voting to grant
a hearing whenever a lower-court decision departed significantly from
[its] most preferred doctrinal position" (Baum 1977, 14). Examining
the 1933-1987 October terms, Pacelle (1991, 192) concludes that
"members of the Court are also important entrepreneurs with policy
goals derived from their values and attitudes. Justices use case selec
tion and the agenda-building process to pursue these goals."
In contrast, some judicial scholars opt for what this study calls the
"quasi-legal" model. Adherents of the quasi-legal model (i.e., Provine

1980; Perry 1991) argue that there are greater legal forces at work in
the Court's case selection process that extra-legal models neglect to
consider. This model takes its theoretical underpinnings from the
words of Pritchett (1969). On commenting on the state of judicial
politics, Pritchett (1969, 42) concluded that "again political scientists
who have done so much to put the 'political' in political jurisprudence
need to emphasize that it is still jurisprudence."
Provine (1980, 172), for example, finds that "a shared conception
of the proper role of a judge prevents the justices from exploiting the
possibilities for power-oriented voting in case selection." Similarly,
Perry argues that if the justices are not driven by some ideological
predisposition to hear a particular case, they focus on legal factors
using what he terms the "jurisprudential mode" (Perry 1991, 277-79).

248

AMERICAN POLmcs QUARTERLY I APRIL 1997

In this study, I begin to resolve this continuing debate by attempting
to discern whether judicial attitudes are important in explaining Court
decision making at the agenda-setting stage for cases involving Ameri
can Indian interests. To answer this question, judicial attitudes at the
agenda-setting stage were measured by (a) taking all cases involving
American Indian interests (as defined as such by U.S. Law Week) that
were granted plenary review by the Court during the 1969-1992
October terms, (b) determining the individual justices' support rates
for these cases at the decision-on-the-merits stage,6 (c) creating a
composite index of these support rates for each natural Court during
the 1969-1992 October terms, and (d) applying this ideological com
posite index to the Court's decisions at the agenda-setting stage. For
thejustices' support rates in cases involving American Indian interests
at the decision-on-the-merits stage during the 1969-1992 October
terms and the coding procedures used, see Appendix A.
The new measure of judicial attitudes used here appears to be
justified because many scholars long have suspected that the Court's
votes on petitions for certiorari are a tentative indicator of the Court's
votes at the decision-on-the-merits stage (i.e., Schubert 1964; Ulmer
1972). As Boucher and Segal (1995, 824) point out, "Long before
terms such as 'backward induction' became part of the parlance of
political science, Schubert (1959, see N) asked what strategies jus
tices would take on certiorari voting if they wished to achieve their
policy goals on the merits."

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY

The 303 certiorari petitions filed involving American Indian inter
ests as the petitioning party during the 1969-1992 October terms were
located in U.S. Law Week.1 Each certiorari petition involving an issue
critical to American Indian interests was then examined in The United
States Records and Briefs on microfiche to determine whether (a) the
Solicitor General's office filed a direct party brief in support of, or
against, American Indian interests; (b) the Solicitor General's office
filed a third party brief in favor of, or in opposition to, American Indian
interests; (c) dissension was present within and between lower courts;
(d) the petitioning party alleged a conflict; (e) a sovereignty issue was
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present; and (f) the number of amici curiae briefs filed by organized
interests in support of, and against, American Indian interests. For
greater conceptual specificity of how this study operationalized the
explanatory variables, see Appendix B.
The Court's support rates at the agenda-setting stage are computed
by dividing the number of cases that the Court supported American
Indian interests over the entire population of cases. In cases where the
parties were Indian versus Tribe, the tribe is coded in favor of Ameri
can Indian interests. This coding scheme advances the position that
the community interest outweighs the individual interest. To explain
the relative influences of the explanatory variables on the dependent
variable (1 if certiorari were granted; 0 otherwise), a logistic regres
sion model is used.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

As evidenced by Table 1, the Court supported American Indian
interests as the petitioning party in 17% of the cases at the agenda
setting stage during the 1969-1992 October terms. As Table 1 also
indicates, the logistic regression model offers moderate explanatory
power. The model correctly explains 88% of the cases. Five of the 11
variables included in the model are important determinants in explain
ing Court decision making in cases involving American Indian inter
ests at the agenda-setting stage. (See Appendix C for the descriptive
statistics of the explanatory variables.)
As anticipated, American Indian interests have clearly benefited in
cases where the Solicitor General's office represented them as a direct
party. What is more helpful to the success of American Indian interests
at the agenda-setting stage is the decision of the Solicitor General's
office to file an amicus curiae brief in support of their position.
Surprisingly, the Court is not less inclined to deny petitions for
certiorari in cases where the Solicitor General's office filed amici
curiae briefs in opposition to American Indian interests. As expected,
however, the Court is less likely to grant petitions for certiorari in cases
where the Solicitor General's office was a direct party against Ameri
can Indian interests. Overall, the Solicitor General's position as a
direct and (usually) as a third party had important influence on the
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TABLEl

Logistic Regression Model for Explaining the Success
of American Interests Before the U.S. Supreme Court
at the Agenda-Setting Stage: 1969-1992 October Terms

Variable
Solicitor General as a party on behalf of
American Indian interests
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae on
behalf of American Indian interests
Solicitor General as a party against
American Indian interests
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae
against American Indian interests
Dissension within a lower court
Dissension between lower courts
Alleged conflict
Sovereignty issue
Number of amici curiae briefs filed on
behalf of American Indian interests
Number of amici curiae briefs filed
against American Indian interests
Judicial attitudes

Estimated
Coefficient

Coefficient/
SE

SE

1.63***

0.61

2.67

2.59***

0.59

4.39

-1.01***

0.50

-2.02

-0.21
0.71**
0.21
0.44
0.80***

0.79
0.42
0.77
0.42
0.40

-0.27
1.69
0.27
1.05
2.00

0.28

0.24

1.16

0.68*
0.67***

0.52
0.33

1.31
2.03

N=303
Constant: -6.54
-2 log likelihood: 203.836
Goodness of fit: 331.339
Model chi-square: 73.602; statistical significance: .00
Mean of dependent variable (Court's support rate): 17.2%
Percentage predicted correctly: 87.75%
NOTE: When coefficient/SE is 2 or more, the relationship has reached a significance level of
.05 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989, 33).
*p < .10, one-tailed test. **p < .05, one-tailed test. ***p < .01, one-tailed test.

Court's decision to grant or deny petitions for certiorari. As Salokar
( 1992, 25) notes,
As the attorney for the United States, the Solicitor General has available
a large pool of possible certiorari requests and selects only a small
number of cases that will most likely meet the standards of the Court
in granting review and, subsequently result in a decision favoring the
government.
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(1993, 1) conclusion that the Solicitor Gen

eral's office "is the E.F. Hiltton of organizational interests-when it
speaks, the Court's listens" appears to be correct. Given the prominent
role of the Solicitor General's office in the Supreme Court's universe,
it comes of little surprise that the success of American Indian interests
as a petitioning litigant largely depended on the support of the office's
direct and (usually) third party briefs.
The presence of a dissension cue does not appear to be an important
determinant for the Court in selecting its cases for plenary review. It
is clear that the Court is not more likely to grant petitions for certiorari
in cases involving American Indian interests where there was at least
one concurring or dissenting opinion in the decision directly below or
where an appellate court reversed a lower court's decision.
Alleged conflict is also not an important cue for the Court in
selecting its cases involving American Indian interests. Given that the
Court considers conflict among and between lower courts as an
important criterion for its case selection, most petitioning attorneys
are naturally going to allege conflicts where they might not actually
exist. As Caldeira and Wright

(1994, 15) note, "Of the petitions for a
6% in 1982 and 11% in 1968 contained real
conflict, and about 60% in 1982 and 52% in 1968 set forth an alleged
writ of certiorari, about

conflict." Thus, in many instances, the petitioning attorney may have
alleged conflict where an actual conflict did not exist.
As hypothesized, the presence of a sovereignty issue is an important
cue for the Court in determining its plenary agenda in cases involving
American Indian interests. Sovereignty issues are an integral part of
the field of federal Indian law because they define the relative roles
that the federal government, states, municipalities, and tribes play in
the regulation of American Indian affairs. Put simply, sovereignty
issues define the status of tribal governments in the political and legal
universe.
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the number of amici
curiae briefs filed in support of, or in opposition to, American Indian
interests does not significantly increase the likelihood that the Court
would grant or deny the case plenary review, respectively. This finding
contradicts the findings of others. Caldeira and Wright

( 1988, 1122),

for example, find that "interested parties can have a significant and
positive impact on the Court's agenda by participating as amici curiae
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prior to the Court's decision on certiorari or jurisdiction." The findings
here may indicate that using the number of amici curiae briefs may
not always be an appropriate measure. Some groups' amici curiae
briefs may hold greater weight with the Court than those of others.
The Solicitor General's briefs, for example, are usually more respected
by the Court. The same may hold true for certain groups' amici curiae
briefs, as the attorneys' experiences and their reputation for filing
quality briefs with the Court may influence Court decision making at
the agenda setting. It is possible that the importance of filing amici
curiae briefs with the Court may be dependent on who files the briefs,
not how many briefs are filed in each case.
Judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model were also
a strong predictor of the Court's decisions in American Indian cases
at the agenda-setting stage. The composite index of the justices'
support rates at the decision-on-the-merits stage in cases involving
American Indian interests was a useful measure for explaining Court
decision making at the agenda-setting stage. This finding may offer
support for those scholars (i.e., Ulmer 1972) who suspect that the
Court's decision to grant or deny petitions for certiorari is inextricably
linked to the Court's votes at the decision-on-the-merits stage.
What is perhaps more important, the method created here to mea
sure judicial attitudes tentatively indicates that the attitudinal forces
that govern decision making at the decision-on-the-merits stage may
also apply to the agenda-setting stage, at least for the case of American
Indian interests during the 1969-1992 October terms. Segal and Spaeth
(1994, 11), however, suggest that
the institutional rules and incentives that allow Supreme Court justices
to engage in attitudinal decision-making in votes on the merits simply
do not apply in full to other courts or to other stages of the Supreme
Court's processing of cases .... But nothing in the attitudinal model,
which was developed explicitly to explain the decision on merits,
requires these factors to be sole explanations of the justices's behavior
at other stages.

Although attitudinal decision making is not the sole explanation in
Court decision making at the agenda-setting stage, it may wield more
influence than initially recognized. These findings may indicate that
judicial scholars may have to rethink the influence of the role of the
attitudinal model at the agenda-setting stage.
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CONCLUSION

Researchers long have examined groups that tum to the courts when
they lack access or clout in the electoral process (Cortner 1968;
Lawrence 1990; O'Connor 1980; Shattuck and Norgren 1979; Vose
1959). Curiously, unlike at the decision-on-the-merits stage, there is
not much scholarly attention devoted to the litigation activities of
politically disadvantaged groups before the U.S. Supreme Court at the
agenda-setting stage (but see Lawrence 1990).
The concept of Supreme Court agenda setting is particularly impor
tant for politically disadvantaged groups, including American Indian
interests. If politically disadvantaged groups have little clout in ma
joritarian institutions, the Supreme Court may be the last forum for
these groups to redress their grievances. Before politically disadvan
taged groups can redress their grievances before the Supreme Court,
however, they first must gain access. Given that over 95% of all
petitions for certiorari fail to win plenary review from the Court and
that the Court has virtually full discretion over its docket, gaining a
hearing before the Supreme Court is a difficult hurdle to clear.
In this study, I examine the litigation activities of a politically
disadvantaged group at the agenda-setting stage that have not garnered
much scholarly attention in judicial politics; that is, American Indian
interests during the 1969-1992 October terms. As anticipated, most of
the traditional cues variables also apply to the Court's case selection
process for petitions filed involving American Indian interests. The
direct and (usually) third party briefs filed by the Solicitor General's
office in favor of or in opposition to are the among the most important
cues in determining the Court's case selection process. The presence
of a sovereignty issue also positively and significantly influenced the
Court's agenda-building process.
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the petitioning party
alleging lower court conflict, dissension, and the number of amici
curiae briefs filed in support of, and in opposition to, American Indian
interests are not important predictors of the Court's case selection
process in cases involving American Indian interests. In the case of
the alleged lower court conflict cue, many of the conflicts that existed
may have been tolerable and, thus, may not have warranted the Court's
immediate attention. In many instances, the petitioning attorney's
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perception of an alleged conflict may not have been the same as the
Court's. When controlling for all of the other explanatory factors, dis
sension was not an important predictor of the Court's agenda-building
process.
The number of amici curiae briefs filed in support of, and in
opposition to, American Indian interests may not have been an impor
tant determinant in the Court's case selection process because raw
numbers alone may not be an appropriate measure for the influence
of organized interests. The quality of the amicus curiae brief filed and
the Court's respect for certain groups' briefs may be more valid
measures in determining the influence of organized interests at the
agenda-setting stage.
Judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model is an
important predictor of the Court's agenda-building process in cases
involving American Indian interests. The new measure takes the
justices' support rates at the decision on the merits stage and applies
them to the agenda-setting stage. This finding may indicate that the
justice's vote at the agenda-setting stage may be a tentative vote for
the decision-on-the-merits stage. What may be more important, the
same attitudinal forces that govern Court decision making at the
decision-on-the-merits stage may also apply at the agenda-setting
stage, at least for the case of American Indian interests during the
1969-1992 October terms. This leaves the question: Can the Court's
agenda-building process for other groups or interests be explained by
the same attitudinal forces that explain American Indian interests?
More scholarly attention is needed before political scientists will have
an adequate answer to this question.

APPENDIX A
The Justices' Support Rates for American Indian Interests
at the Decision-on-the-Merits Stage: 1969-1992 October Terms
Justices

Douglas
Marshall
Brennan
Blackrnun
Stewart

Support Rates (NJ
0.94 (16)
0.76 (70)
0.74 (68)
0.63 (72)
0.55 (38)
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Support Rates (N)

Burger

0.50 (58)

Harlan

0.50 (2)

Powell

0.45 (56)

White

0.43 (75)

Souter

0.40 (5)

O'Connor

0.36 (36)

Stevens

0.33 (58)

Rehnquist

0.30 (71)

Scalia

0.25 (16)

Thomas

0.25 (4)

Kennedy

0.10 (10)

Black

0.00 (3)

SOURCE: Coding scheme: The 82 full opinion cases regarding American Indian interests
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court were identified in U.S. Law Week and examined in the U.S.
Reports. Each case was coded as decided by the justices as for or against American Indian
interests. Seven cases were excluded from analysis because they were split decisions; that is, the
Court and thejustices affirmed and reversed on the central issues in the case, leaving a population
of 75 cases. Success rates were computed by dividing the number of cases in which each
individual justice supported American Indian claims over the total population of cases. For the
coding of judicial attitudes in this study, see Appendix B.

APPENDIX B
Coding of the Variables
Dependent variable
If the Court grants the petition for certiorari, 1; otherwise, 0.
Explanatory variables
If the Solicitor General's office is a direct party on behalf of American Indian interests, 1;
otherwise, 0.
If the Solicitor General's office is a direct party in opposition to American Indian interests,
1; otherwise, 0.
If the Solicitor General's office files an arnicus curiae brief on behalf of American Indian
interests, 1; otherwise, 0.
If the Solicitor General's office files an arnicus curiae brief in opposition to American Indian
interests, 1; otherwise, 0.
If lower court dissension is present, 1; otherwise, 0.
If the petitioning party alleges intercircuit court conflict, 1; otherwise, 0.
If a sovereignty issue is present, 1; otherwise, 0.
The number of amici curiae briefs filed by organiz.ed interests on behalf of American Indian
interests (ordinal variable ranging theoretically from 0 to infinity).
The number of amici curiae briefs filed by organized interests in opposition to American
Indian interests (ordinal variable ranging theoretically from 0 to infinity).
The ideological composite index for each natural Court could range theoretically from 0
(completely conservative) to 9 (completely liberal). Each justice's support rate could
theoretically range from 0 (no support) to 1 (complete support). The support rates were
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obtained by taking all cases that were granted plenary review by the Court during the
1969-1992 October terms (as defined as such by U.S. Law Week). Each full opinion case

was examined in the U.S. Repons to determine if each individual justice supported the
position advocated by American Indian interests at the decision-on-the-merits stage (1 if
the justice sided with American Indian interests; 0 otherwise); per curiam cases and
summary dispositions were excluded from the analysis. The justices' support rates for the
1969-1992 October terms were then added for all of the justices who served on each
natural Court. The composite index for each natural Court was then applied to the
agenda-setting stage.

APPENDIX C
Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables

Variable

Solicitor General's office as a party on
behalf of American Indian interests
Solicitor General's office as an
amicus curiae on behalf of
American Indian interests
Solicitor General's office as a party
against American Indian interests
Solicitor General's office as an amicus
curiae against American Indian interests
Dissension within the lower court
Dissension between lower courts
Petitioning party alleging conflict
Sovereignty issue
The number of amici curiae briefs filed
on behalf of American Indian interests
The number of amici curiae briefs filed
against American Indian interests
Judicial attitudes
Number of cases (N): 303

Minimum

Maximum

M

SD

Score

Score

0.05

0.22

0

0,07

0.27

0

0.44

0.50

0

0.04

0.19

0

0.18

0.38

0

0.19

0.39

0

0.62

0.49

0

0.34

0.47

0

0.28

0.77

0

7

0.06

0.29

0

3

4.47

0.61

3.05

5.30

NOTES
1. Cases involving American Indian interests are those defined as such by U.S. Law Week.
These cases include American Indian interests as the petitioner as well as the respondent.
2. Although American Indian interests are truly a disadvantaged minority in terms of a sense
of powerlessness, numbers, racial or cultural characteristics, and a sense of group solidarity, their
status as citizens in separate tribal nations gives them a unique political status that is different
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from that of other politically disadvantaged groups. Thus the relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes is also a political one.
3. Although the Court does not (usually) offer any reasons for granting or denying an
individual petition for certiorari, Rule 10 of the U.S. Supreme Court Rules offers some guidance
for petitioning attorneys, namely, in cases where there are intercircuit court conflicts between
U.S. courts of appeals or state courts on a federal question, or in cases where a lower court has
"so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ... to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of supervision." Rule 10, however, is minimized by its introductory
paragraph, which stipulates that "a review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion ....The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered."
4. Ulmer ( 1984) defines two types of intercircuit court conflict, alleged and real. Although
there has been a general consensus among scholars on how to conceptualize alleged intercircuit
court conflict, there is little agreement on an operational definition of real intercircuit court
conflict.Feeney ( 1975, 305), for example, defined intercircuit court conflict as a "case in which
the decision below deals with the same explicit point as some other case and reaches a
contradictory result.Feeney's definition included conflicts involving federal district courts, state
courts, or circuit courts (1975, 304). In a subsequent study, two former Supreme Court law clerks,
Estreicher and Sexton, narrowed the operational definition of real intercircuit court conflict to
contradictions in "decisions by state courts of last resort or federal courts of appeals" (1984,
1010-11). Still, Ulmer's definition includes only "cases involving conflict with Supreme Court
precedents or conflicts in the [federal] circuits" (1984, 182). To magnify the problem further,
many real intercircuit court conflicts need to percolate longer in the lower courts before the U.S.
Supreme Court will decide the issues on their merits (O'Brien 1990, 215; Perry 1991, 230). In
addition, whether it truly exists depends on one's interpretation of what "real conflict" is. Thus,
given the several measurement problems associated with operationalizing real intercircuit court
conflict, it was excluded from the analysis.
5. Although judicial scholars have applied the "error correcting" strategy most often to the
agenda-setting stage, other theories have been examined. Among others, the "prediction" and
the "majority" strategies have shown moderate explanatory power in predicting the Court's case
selection process.Adherents of the prediction strategy posit that there is a positive nexus between
a justice's decision to grant certiorari and being part of the winning coalition at the final vote.
Advocates of the majority strategy hold that the justices will vote more often to grant certiorari
when they part of the ideological majority on the Court. For extended discussions of these
strategies, see Baum (1977), Brenner and Krol (1989), Boucher and Segal (1995), Krol and
Brenner (1990), and Palmer (1982).
6. In this study, I specifically chose not to use the Spaeth database because in the Spaeth
data American Indian cases are operationalized as those cases where American Indians are a
party. In this study, in contrast, I examine all cases that had an impact on American Indian interests,
including those cases where the federal government is a party on behalf of American Indian
interests. In addition, in this study I purposely do not use the ideological values created by Segal
and Cover (1989) because "some scholars of the Court have attempted to push the Segal/Cover
scores beyond their intended limits, along the way stretching (and, perhaps, surpassing) the range
of reliability and validity of the measures" (Epstein and Mershon 1996, 262). Segal and Cover
are mindful to caution future use of their ideological measure, which was almost exclusively
designed to examine cases involving civil rights and civil liberties issues.In contrast, American
Indian cases involve issues regarding federalism, taxation, judicial power, federal and state
preemption, natural resources, and so on (e.g., see Hermann and O'Connor 1996). For a more
detailed discussion of the validity and reliability problems associated with using the Segal and
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Cover ideological scores in cases not exclusively using civil rights and civil liberties issues, see
Epstein and Mershon (1996).
7. A list of these cases is available by contacting the author.
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